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Informal dispute resolution is common in rural areas of Af-
ghanistan because of a general lack of access to or inefficiency of 
the formal mechanisms in those areas. While the Afghan informal 
dispute resolution systems have been known to resolve some crimi-
nal cases in ways that violate human rights or deviate sharply from 
Afghan formal law, it is possible to minimize these practices while 
taking advantage of some of the strengths that informal dispute 
resolution offers. This paper argues that some Native American 
Tribal justice systems could serve as helpful models for the Afghan 
approach to informal justice because they offer effective informal 
dispute resolution and peacemaking systems that are consistent 
with the formal justice system and do not violate human rights. 
Accordingly, this paper begins with an introduction to informal 
dispute resolution mechanisms in both Afghanistan and selected 
Native American Tribal systems, elaborating on the interaction 
between the informal and official state laws in these various sys-
tems. Next, it describes the failed attempts of the Afghan central 
authority to rule in the informal justice systems and integrate them 
into the formal legal structure. Then the paper will provide possi-
ble solutions which would include coordination between the formal 
and informal justice systems, monitoring of the cases within the 
informal system, including important criminal cases such as honor 
killings, theft, rape, and serious injury by members of the official 
system including provincial governor, district governor, and other 
law enforcement institutions. Finally, this paper offers some sug-
gestions for how to respond once the monitoring bodies identify 
violations of human rights and Afghan law. 
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I. INTRODUCTION TO AFGHAN INFORMAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Afghan informal dispute resolution is a procedure in which parties 
bring their cases to community leaders or a third party who assists 
discussions and negotiations to reach a solution and to avoid legal 
proceedings.1 Informal dispute resolution is common in rural areas of 
Afghanistan because of a general lack of access or inefficiency of the 
formal mechanism in those areas.2 The Afghanistan Independence 
Human Right Commission illustrates in their report that there are no trial 
courts in 86 districts, “176 districts have no detention center and 92 
districts have no active attorney.”3 Hence, a large number of criminal and 
civil disputes in Afghanistan are decided outside of the formal legal 
system through shuras and jirgas—informal systems that apply 
customary law.4
The Afghan informal dispute resolution system has been praised for 
its advantages such as promptness, clarity, cultural familiarity, reliable 
and prompt resolutions, low cost, and accessibility.5 It also has a 
reputation for unanimous enforceable decisions, trustworthiness and 
fairness, restorative justice, and preservation of harmony within the 
community.6 Accordingly, a wide variety of civil and criminal disputes 
are resolved at the community level—most of which are land, water, and 
fuel disputes in civil cases, and deliberate and accidental killings, theft, 
runaways, and rape in criminal cases.7
 1. NOAH COBURN & JOHN DEMPSEY, U.S. INST. OF PEACE, INFORMATION DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION IN AFGHANISTAN 3 (2010),
http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/resources/sr247_0.pdf.
 2. THOMAS BARFIELD ET AL., U.S. INST. OF PEACE, THE CLASH OF TWO GOODS:
STATE AND NON-STATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN AFGHANISTAN 2 (2006),
http://www.usip.org/files/file/clash_two_goods.pdf. 
 3. President’s Judicial Strengthening Decree Had No Impact: AIHRC, TOLO
NEWS (Mar. 3, 2013, 9:12 AM), http://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/presidents-
judicial-strengthening-decree-had-no-impact-aihrc. 
 4. JOHN DEMPSEY & NOAH COBURN, U.S. INST. OF PEACE, TRADITIONAL DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION AND STABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN 2 (2010),
https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PB%2010%20Traditional%20Dispute%20Resolut
ion%20and%20Stability%20in%20Afghanistan.pdf.
 5. Id. at 3. 
 6. Id.; see also BARFIELD ET AL., supra note 2. 
 7. Deborah J. Smith, Keeping the Peace; Gender, Justice and Authority: 
Mechanisms for Community Based Dispute Resolution in Afghanistan, in BEYOND THE
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While informal dispute resolution serves a respected and important 
role in Afghanistan, some of the common practices have been criticized 
for violating human rights and sharply deviating from Afghan formal 
laws.8 For example, women are completely excluded in the judgment 
processes—men represent women and women are not allowed to defend 
themselves or to be present during any hearings or proceedings.9 Another 
criticism of the Afghan informal dispute resolution system is that 
community-based mechanisms can be very susceptible to influence by 
warlords.10 These local power-holders, who are sometimes elected as 
members of informal dispute resolution councils, are more likely to 
misuse the informal system.11 Finally, other important concerns include 
customary practices like honor-killings, forced and underage marriage, 
badal (or direct vengeance), and payment of blood money in lieu of 
punishment.12 One of the most controversial practices in the informal 
system is the practice of “baad”—the forced marriage of a woman from 
an offender’s family to the victim’s close relative to settle a dispute.13
This aspect of informal dispute resolution has caught serious attention of 
the international community and human rights activists.14 In fact, the 
Afghan government has been under extreme pressure to resolve this issue 
by trying to establish a relationship with informal justice mechanisms.15
This paper attempts to show how those government efforts could be 
improved for more effective use of resources and increased justice for 
the Afghan people through learning from the example of Native 
American tribes. Native American Tribal justice systems could serve as 
‘WILD TRIBES’: UNDERSTANDING MODERN AFGHANISTAN AND DIASPORA 75 (Ceri Oeppen 
& Angela Schlenkhoff eds., 2010). 
 8. BARFIELD ET AL., supra note 2, at 3. 
 9. Id.; see generally U.S. INST. OF PEACE, CONFERENCE ON THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN STATE AND NON-STATE JUSTICE SYSTEMS IN AFGHANISTAN (2006),
http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/conference_summary_paper.pdf.  
 10. See BARFIELD ET AL., supra note 2, at 14–15; see also U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L
DEV., AFGHANISTAN RULE OF LAW PROJECT: FIELD STUDY OF INFORMAL AND CUSTOMARY
JUSTICE IN AFGHANISTAN AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON IMPROVING ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND 
RELATIONS BETWEEN FORMAL COURTS AND INFORMAL BODIES 11 (2005). 
11. UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, supra note 10. 
 12. BARFIELD ET AL., supra note 2, at 3. 
 13. UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE, supra note 9, at 3. 
 14. BARFIELD ET AL., supra note 2, at 3. 
 15. Id. at 24. 
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helpful models for the Afghan approach to informal justice because they 
offer effective informal dispute resolution and “Peacemaking” systems 
that follow rules and regulations set by the formal tribal justice system. 
For instance, some Native American tribes use Peacemaking Programs 
for family disputes, alcohol related behavior, domestic violence, and 
even sex offenses.16 Through the Peacemaking system, Peacemakers do 
not make decisions or impose punishments; however, they facilitate and 
guide parties to talk and to discuss the causes of conflict so that they can 
reach a decision amongst themselves.17 Peacemakers encourage parties to 
eliminate conflicts by opening communication with respect and 
responsibility, helping parties assist themselves through healing their 
spirits, minds, and bodies.18 Peacemakers work in cooperation and 
harmony with the formal justice system.19 Learning from this cooperative 
approach in which traditional ways of dispute resolution are respected, 
this paper argues that, similar to the Native American informal justice 
system, the formal justice system in Afghanistan should form a 
relationship of communication and respect with the informal systems. 
This relationship could enable a process of monitoring by the formal 
system and an acceptable procedure by which formal courts could take 
jurisdiction over serious crimes such as honor killings, murder, rape, and 
sex offenses.  
This paper begins with an introduction to informal dispute resolution 
mechanisms in both Afghanistan and selected Native American Tribal 
systems, elaborating on the interaction between the informal and official 
state law in these various systems. Next, it describes the failed attempts 
of the Afghan central authority to rule in the informal justice systems and 
integrate them into the formal legal structure. Then the paper will 
provide possible cooperative solutions which would include coordination 
and respect between the formal and informal justice systems, monitoring 
of cases by members of the formal system including provincial governor, 
district governor, and other law enforcement institutions, and 
implementing procedures for removing important criminal cases such as 
 16. See generally JUDICIAL BRANCH OF THE NAVAJO NATION, PEACEMAKING (A
GUIDE TO THE PEACEMAKING PROGRAM OF THE NAVAJO NATION) (2004),
http://www.navajocourts.org/Peacemaking/peaceguide.pdf. 
 17. Id.
 18. Id.
 19. See generally id.
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honor killings, theft, rape, and serious injuries to the formal system. 
Finally, this paper offers some suggestions for how to respond once the 
monitoring bodies identify violations of human rights and formal Afghan 
law. 
II. An Introduction to the Afghan Legal System
The complexities of Afghanistan’s geography and religious, cultural, 
and political history have led to an equally complex legal landscape that 
incorporates various cultural traditions and religious perspectives.20 As a 
landlocked country located in central Asia, its culture, traditions, and 
customs reflect those of its neighbors such as Pakistan, Iran, 
Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and China.21 Afghanistan has been 
an essential strategic and geopolitics location throughout its history. 
Islam was brought to Afghanistan during the eighth century by the 
followers of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH).22 Prior to the introduction of 
Islam, Afghanistan was ruled by various Persian, Greek, Sassasian, and 
Central Asian empires.23 In 1747, Ahmad Shah was elected by an Afghan 
Jirga as king of Afghanistan.24 He unified different Afghan tribes and 
extended its emperor.25 His clan was able to rule Afghanistan for the next 
200 years.26 Contemporary Afghanistan has a population of 
approximately 30,000,000 and its legal system is composed of three 
competing parts: Islamic law, customary law, and civil law.27 This 
mixture of Islamic, customary law, and civil law somewhat overlap.28
 20. Adam Ritscher, A Brief History of Afghanistan, Address at the Students 
Against War Teach-In (2002), http://www.afghangovernment.com/briefhistory.htm.  
 21. See generally  MARVIN G. WEINBAUM, U.S. INST. OF PEACE, AFGHANISTAN 
AND ITS NEIGHBORS: AN EVER DANGEROUS NEIGHBORHOOD (2006).  
 22. Ritscher, supra note 20. 
 23. WILLIAM KERR FRASER TYTLER, AFGHANISTAN: A STUDY OF POLITICAL
DEVELOPMENT IN CENTRAL ASIA 47 (1950).  
 24. JASWANT LAL MEHTA, ADVANCED STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF MODERN INDIA,
1707-1813 at 246–48 (2005). 
 25. Ritscher, supra note 20. 
 26. Id.
 27. AFG. RESEARCH AND EVALUATION UNIT, THE A TO Z GUIDE TO AFGHANISTAN
ASSISTANCE 75 (Jay Lamey ed., 9th ed. 2011); see also MARTIN LAU, INT’L COMM’N OF 
JURISTS, AFGHANISTAN’S LEGAL SYSTEM AND ITS COMPATIBILITY WITH INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS 4 (2002). 
 28. BARFIELD ET AL., supra note 2, at 22. 
2017] What Afghan Law Can Learn From Native American Peacemaking 83
Throughout its history, Afghanistan’s legal system was based on Islamic 
law and customary law.29 Islamic law was implemented by proficient 
religious judges following the Hanafi jurisprudence.30 Unlike common 
law, there was no system of judicial precedent (stare decisis) in the 
country.31 Islamic scholars (Ulama) were supposed to use their broad 
knowledge of Islamic law and its authoritative sources, Quran, hadith,
and Hanafi jurisprudence to create legal norms.32 Until the formation of 
the modern Afghan state, Islamic scholars were independent in leading 
the legal system and providing both laws and legal interpretations.33 In 
other words, the Afghan legal system fell under religious law. Customary 
law was implemented in the most rural areas; at the same time, however, 
there were no statutory provisions.34
There are variations from province to province with respect to the 
relationships between formal and informal justice systems—meaning 
that in some provinces, people refer to informal justice systems more 
than they do to formal justice systems.35 In some provinces such as 
Nangarhar, there is collaboration between the formal and informal justice 
systems.36 However, in some other provinces, the courts are averse to the 
informal dispute resolution system.37 Legal pluralism in Afghanistan is 
composed of the interaction and cooperation between Sharia law, 
custom, and state law including international human right principles 
within the state law’s framework.38 Accordingly, the key features of legal 
 29. Id. at 12–13; See also AMIN TARZI, U.S. INST. OF PEACE, HISTORICAL
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STATE AND NON-STATE JUDICIAL SECTORS IN AFGHANISTAN 2
(2006).
 30. BARFIELD ET AL., supra note 2, at 12; see also Amin Tarzi, The Judicial State: 
Evolution and Centralization of the Courts in Afghanistan, 1883-1896 (May 2003) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, New York University).  
 31. See THOMAS BARFIELD, AFGHAN CUSTOMARY LAW AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO 
FORMAL JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS, U.S. INST. OF PEACE 2 (2003), 
http://www.usip.org/files/file/barfield2.pdf. 
 32. BARFIELD ET AL., supra note 2, at 12. 
 33. BARFIELD, supra note 31, at 2. 
 34. See generally id.
 35. UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE, supra note 9, at 2.  
 36. Smith, supra note 7, at 77–80.  
 37. Esther Meininghaus, Legal Pluralism in Afghanistan, in WORKING PAPER
SERIES 72, at 16 (Amu Darya Project Working Paper No. 8, 2007). 
38. Id. at 1.
84 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 25.1 
pluralism defined in Afghanistan’s context constitute religious, 
customary law, and statutory law.39
In the late 20th century, the codification process began and state legal 
codes became the exclusive source of legal authority—these laws were 
firmly based on Islamic Law.40 King Abdur Rahman began to codify 
statues and codes in 1880.41 He created a state-run court system and 
elevated the status of Islamic law to the status of official state law.42
Through legal reforms, he distinguished sources of law in Afghanistan.43
He divided them into three categories: Islamic law, customary law, and 
statutory law.44 He also established three types of courts: Islamic law 
courts, criminal courts, and commercial law courts.45 Thus, the legal 
system of Afghanistan became mixed. In 1923, during King Amanullah’s 
reign, the first modern constitution of Afghanistan was passed and major 
social and legal reforms were carried out through a series of codes and 
decrees.46 Turkish and French advisers assisted with these legal 
reforms.47 Thus, it was the French civil law that made the basis of much 
of King Amanullah’s legislation.48 Since then, hundreds of laws have 
been passed throughout different regimes.49
39. Naafay Choudhury, Reconceptualizing Legal Pluralism in Afghanistan, in 
THE SELECTED PROCEEDINGS OF THE 3RD ANNUAL CANADIAN LAW STUDENT CONFERENCE,
WINDSOR REV. OF LEGAL AND SOC. ISSUES 21, 36–37 (S. Alex Constantin et al., eds., 
2010); Thomas Barfield, Culture and Custom in Nation-Building: Law in Afghanistan, 60
ME. L. REV. 347, 351 (2008). 
 40. Meininghaus, supra note 37; Katherine McCullough, Out with the Old and in 
with the New: The Long Struggle for Judicial Reform in Afghanistan, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 821, 824–25 (2006). 
 41. RAMIN MOSCHTAGHI, AFGHAN COURT ORGANIZATION AND ITS COMPLIANCE
WITH THE CONSTITUTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (Max Planck, 3rd ed. 2009).
 42. See generally Tarzi, supra note 30. 
 43. Id.
 44. Tarzi, supra note 29, at 3–4. 
 45. MOSCHTAGHI, supra note 41, at 4.
 46. See generally LEON B. POULLADA, REFORM AND REBELLION IN AFGHANISTAN,
1919-1929: KING AMANULLAH’S FAILURE TO MODERNIZE A TRIBAL SOCIETY (Cornell 
University Press 1973).
 47. MOSCHTAGHI, supra note 41, at 3.
 48. Id. at 5.
 49. For most of these laws, see generally MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI, LAW IN 
AFGHANISTAN: A STUDY OF CONSTITUTIONS, MATRIMONIAL LAW AND THE JUDICIARY (C. 
A. O. van Nieuwenhuijze ed., 1985). 
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Adopted in 2004, the new Constitution of Afghanistan identified the 
Supreme Court as the highest judicial organ, heading the judicial power 
of Afghanistan.50 Until 2005, the 1990 Law of the Jurisdiction and 
Organization of the Courts of Afghanistan governed the court system.51
In June 2005, the Afghan government passed a new law regulating the 
judiciary and courts—Law on Organization and Authority of the Courts 
of Afghanistan.52 According to the new law, the court hierarchy in 
Afghanistan is comprised of the Supreme Court as the highest court and 
final court of appeal, the Appellate Court as the intermediate court, and 
the Primary Court.53 The new law also provided for the establishment of 
special courts such as family courts and an anti-corruption court.54
Custom forms a core foundation of the Afghanistan’s legal system. 
Many Afghan people see themselves as good Muslims, so they believe 
their culture and customs should be in accordance with Islamic Laws.55
Researchers Sharma and Kumar state in an article that customary law in 
Afghanistan is a combination of the historical, traditional, and local 
understanding of Shari’a and sometimes the spiritual interpretation of 
Sufi preachers.56 Furthermore, Ali Wardak in his seminal article, 
“Building a Post-War Justice System in Afghanistan,” notes that 
customary law resembles the spirit of “restorative justice,” where values 
are put on the restoration of dignity and friendship between offenders 
 50. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN Jan. 26, 2004, 
art. 116; Rep. of S.C., Agreement on Provisional Arrangement in Afghanistan Pending 
the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions, U.N. Doc. S/2001/1154, at 4 
(2001).
 51. MATTEO TONDINI, STATE BUILDING AND JUSTICE REFORM: POST-CONFLICT 
RECONSTRUCTION IN AFGHANISTAN 52–53 (Michael Pugh ed., 4th ed. 2010). 
 52. Id.
 53. See generally MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, Law on Organization and Jurisdiction of 
Courts of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 851 OFFICIAL GAZETTE 1 (2005). 
 54. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN, arts. 69, 78, 
127; TONDINI, supra note 51, at 52–53. 
 55. See generally T. Barfield, Afghanistan: The Local and the Global in the 
Practice of Shari’a, in SHARI’A POLITICS: ISLAMIC LAW AND SOCIETY IN THE MODERN
WORLD 179 (Robert Hefner ed., 2011). 
 56. Sudhindra Sharma & Pawan Kumar Sen, Institutionalization of the Justice 
System, in STATE BUILDING, SECURITY, AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN AFGHANISTAN:
REFLECTIONS ON A SURVEY ON THE AFGHAN PEOPLE 46 (Ruth Rennie ed., 2008). 
86 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 25.1 
and victims.57 William Maley, a researcher on Afghanistan’s post-war 
justice reforms, also suggests that customary law gives traditional 
legitimacy to Afghanistan’s legal system.58
Although some customs are essential to dispute resolution, some of 
them are harmful to society and conflict with state laws. For instance, 
jailing the women who run away from forced marriages without family 
permission; the practice of badal (the exchange of girls between two 
families); the marriage promise of an unborn girl to an unborn boy; 
engagement during childhood; and badd (where girls are given for 
marriage as compensation for a crime—the girls get married to a member 
of the family of the victim to end and prevent future enmity between the 
families).59 These traditional approaches to conflict resolution, 
restoration, and punishment are problematic, but widely practiced. 
However, there are also many important, just, and effective ways that the 
informal justice system helps people resolve conflict, addressing a wide 
range of issues including civil disputes such as land, family disputes, and 
criminal disputes such as, murder, theft, and assault, rape, and adultery.60
III. BACKGROUND: PROBLEMS OF INFORMAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN 
AFGHANISTAN
Throughout history, the Afghan formal legal system has tried to play a 
central role in governing of the lives of the majority of Afghan citizens—
especially in rural areas. A split in the legal system between formal and 
informal has existed ever since an endeavor was made to create statutory 
laws.61 However, after the Taliban government fell, informal dispute 
resolution increasingly gained authority because the new government 
failed to control rural areas and to provide security to the public.62
 57. Ali Wardak, Building a Post-War Justice System in Afghanistan, 41 CRIME,
LAW & SOC. CHANGE 319, 336 (2004). 
 58. WILLIAM MALEY, ASIA FOUNDATION REPORT 2008, BUILDING LEGITIMACY IN 
POST-TALIBAN AFGHANISTAN, STATE BUILDING, SECURITY AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN 
AFGHANISTAN: REFLECTIONS ON A SURVEY OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE 7 (2008). 
 59. Meininghaus, supra note 37, at 13; UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR 
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, supra note 10, at 48. 
 60. See generally DEMPSEY & COBURN, supra note 4. 
 61. Alison Luke et al., Customary Laws: Background, in WOMEN’S EQUALITY IN 
AFGHANISTAN, http://www.iwrp.org/pdf/afghan_paper.pdf. 
 62. Id.
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Afghanistan has fourteen different ethnic groups who share a common 
religion: Islam.63 Their combination of cultures and strong religious 
beliefs create the regional informal justice system that is practiced in 
Afghanistan today.64 Some of the informal dispute mechanisms may 
violate human rights,65 while others are beneficial to the Afghan 
community. This paper will address both harmful and peaceful aspects of 
dispute resolution.    
a. Peaceful Informal Dispute Resolution
Despite the serious problems discussed above, a majority of Afghans 
continue to turn to traditional or informal justice mechanisms to address 
both civil and criminal disputes. These mechanisms include tribal 
councils, consultation, and mediation with village and religious leaders.66
In rural areas of Afghanistan, including areas recently cleared of 
insurgents, the best mechanism to make essential, visible, short-term 
gains in peacefully resolving disputes is to refer cases to the local 
traditional mechanisms, “including tribal and community councils that 
have operated in local communities for centuries.”67 “These councils . . . 
[are usually composed] of community elders and other respected 
individuals sitting together to reach [reasonable] resolutions of disputes . 
. . .”68 In addition, informal dispute resolution has the advantage of 
familiarity with the people of communities in rural areas and is less 
costly, more accessible, and more effective than formal courts.69 The 
local shuras and jirgas focus on the consent of parties — not on a winner 
and loser — so a decision is reached faster than in formal courts.70
People in rural areas of Afghanistan have special respect for community 
 63. Id.
 64. Id.
 65. Kathryn Lockett, The Situation of Women and Girls in Afghanistan, in
BEYOND THE ‘WILD TRIBES’: UNDERSTANDING MODERN AFGHANISTAN AND ITS DIASPORA 
34 (Ceri Oeppen & Angela Schlenkhoff, eds., 2010). 
 66. DEMPSEY & COBURN, supra note 4, at 2. 
 67. Id.
 68. Id.
 69. Id.
 70. Id.
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leaders and elders; thus, because they are respected, most of leaders’ 
decisions are accepted by parties to the dispute.71
For instance, in the Bamiyan province of Afghanistan, a girl whose 
name was Aqela loved a boy whose name was Nasir.72 They wanted 
marry each other and Nasir asked the girl’s father to accept their 
engagement.73 Aqela’s father did not reject the request, but he demanded 
a high bride-price from Nasir.74 Nasir could not afford this price so the 
couple ran away together.75 When elders of the village caught them, they 
investigated whether the girl ran away freely or by force.76 When they 
found that the girl had gone with Nasir freely, they advised the girl’s 
family to agree on an affordable bride-price.77 Aqela’s father finally 
accepted and the couple was able to marry each other.78 This case 
illustrates how elders can help communities solve their disputes in a 
peaceful ways, in less time, and with desirable results. 
In another case, Jalasa (an elders’ panel) endeavored to solve a family 
dispute between two brothers peacefully.79 The victim, Fauzia, was 
beaten by her brother-in-law’s family which resulted in a miscarriage.80
After referring the case to Jalasa, the panel found Fauzia’s brother-in-
law guilty and decided that he should compensate all of Fauzia’s medical 
expenses.81 The parties agreed, and the dispute was resolved peacefully. 
82
In addition to solving these smaller disputes between individuals, 
sometimes jirga and shura can solve much larger disputes too and in 
much less time than a formal Afghan court.83 An example of such a 
 71. COBURN & DEMPSEY, supra note 1, at 2–3. 
 72. See DEBORAH J. SMITH & SHELLY MANALAN, COMMUNITY-BASED DISPUTE
RESOLUTION PROCESSES IN BAMIYAN PROVINCE 44 (Vicki Quinlan ed., Afg. Research and 
Evaluation 2009). 
 73. Id.
 74. Id.
 75. See id. 
 76. Id.
 77. Id.
 78. Id.
79. See id. at 40. 
 80. Id.
 81. Id.
 82. See id.
 83. DEMPSEY & COBURN, supra note 4, at 3; see also Smith, supra note 7, at 76–
77.
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dispute concerned possession of and the right to live in a village as a 
member of a particular clan or tribe.84 Two qawms (clans), “(one of 
settled villagers and one of Kuchi, who had migrated to the area for 
generations, and who during the Soviet-mujahideen war had settled in 
the village more permanently),” in Nangarhar province had a land 
dispute that led a villager to burn Kuchis’ houses.85 This large dispute 
was brought to various formal courts and government bodies since the 
collapse of the Soviet Union; however, the courts were unable to solve 
the dispute.86 However, recently, a jirga, presided over by the governor 
of the Nangarhar province, was capable of solving this dispute.87 Even 
though the government officials were involved, such as the governor and 
police, none of the violators who burned the houses were ever 
prosecuted.88 Instead of prosecuting them, the jirga used customary 
practices to maintain peace in the village.89 According to the decision of 
the jirga, those who burned the houses had to apologize and walk toward 
the Kuchis’ village without showing pride. 90 In addition, the Kuchi had 
to commit themselves to the village and to protect the security of the 
village and its people from outside threats.91
The above decisions show not only fairness but also prevention of 
enmity between families and communities. For this reason, this paper 
asserts that the Afghan government, and also the people of the various 
Afghan communities, should support the continuation and preservation 
of this kind of informal dispute resolution.   
b. Informal Dispute Resolution and Violations of Individual 
Rights
Although informal dispute resolution is more accessible, less costly, 
more legitimate, and less corrupt than government courts, it frequently 
fails to protect many basic individual rights, particularly women’s rights. 
 84. See Smith, supra note 7, at 76–77. 
 85. Id. at 76. 
 86. Id.
 87. Id.
 88. Id.
 89. Id. at 76–77. 
 90. Id. at 77. 
 91. Id.
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In addition, informal dispute resolution sometimes violates state law and 
Islamic principles.92 Some examples of harmful informal dispute 
resolution outcomes are Baad (giving away girls to settle disputes, 
kidnaping or adultery), Baadal (exchange marriages), child marriages, 
and honor killings.93
The practice of baad (giving away of girls to resolve a dispute) is 
common in some rural areas of Afghanistan.94 According to a report of 
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, in the central region 
of Afghanistan, where the government has less authority and weak 
institutions, baad is widely-practiced.95 As an informal dispute 
resolution, baad is used for resolution of criminal cases involving 
adultery, rape, and murder.96 The practice of baad contradicts state law, 
Islamic principles, and violates human rights. As an example, in one 
murder case in the Wazir tribe of Afghanistan, a jirga decided that the 
defendant family should give the murder victim’s family 300,000 
Pakistani Rupees as compensation; further, a girl was arranged to be 
married to a member of the victim’s family.97 The reason for these 
practices of giving girls for marriage is to tie two families together 
through marriage and to change the “severe enmity into friendship;”98
however, the consent of the girl is not considered nor the future the girl 
will face. In addition, unlike formal courts, the jirga “seek compensation 
for the wrong done and social reconciliation, not the punishment of the 
[wrongdoer].”99
 92. See generally CHRIS JOHNSON ET AL., AFGHANISTAN’S POLITICAL AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT (Overseas Dev. Inst. 2003), 
https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/5888.pdf; 
Rep. of the U.N. Assistance Mission in Afg., Harmful Traditional Practices and 
Implementation of the Law on Elimination of Violence Against Women in Afghanistan 
(Dec. 9, 2010), 
https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/filesharmful_traditional_practices_english.pdf 
[hereinafter UNAMA]. 
 93. See generally UNAMA, supra note 92. 
 94. Id.
 95. Id. at 11. 
 96. Id.
 97. Luke et al., supra note 61. 
 98. Id.
 99. BARFIELD, supra note 31, at 14. 
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In another case from 2010, a 19 year-old girl was married to a 13-year 
old boy when her brother ran away with the boy’s sister.100 In this case, 
the runaway girl was fleeing her forced engagement with another boy.101
A local shura from the Paryan district of Panjsher province mediated the 
case and decided that the father of the boy with whom the girl had eloped 
should pay $11,600 and give one of his daughters as compensation to the 
family of the girl’s previous fiancée.102 The father of the boy who eloped 
had to sell his livestock and land to pay for this compensation.103
Another example of harmful informal dispute resolution outcomes is 
the forced marriage of adulterers and victims of kidnaping. “In cases 
involving the kidnapping of women or adultery, some tribes force the 
parties to marry, even against the wishes of the female involved.”104
“Marriage is often ordered in these cases on the basis of a belief that the 
female’s chastity may have been taken, thereby compromising the 
honour and dignity of the woman and her family.”105 “For example, in 
Nuristan [province of Afghanistan], if a married women [sic] is 
‘consensually kidnapped,’ the Jirga compels the current husband to 
divorce the woman so she can be married to the kidnapper.”106 “The 
former husband would be further compensated with the return of the 
dowry he previously paid and receiving animals from the offender.”107
Similarly, in some parts of the Kunduz Province, “if an unmarried couple 
commits adultery, the couple is ordered to be married and the family of 
the woman is compensated.”108
Another dispute that is decided by the elders of a tribe or community 
is rape.109 “Investigation and penalty in rape cases is largely unaddressed 
within Afghan systems of customary law.”110 “Loss of virginity is 
perceived as ruinous to the prospects of women and girls and, as such, is 
 100. UNAMA, supra note 92, at 13. 
 101. Id.
 102. Id.
 103. Id.
 104. Luke et al., supra note 61. 
 105. Id.
 106. Id.
 107. Id.
 108. Id.
 109. Id.
 110. Id.
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hidden by the community whenever possible.”111 In the case of rape or 
sexual harassment, when a woman reports that she has been raped or 
sexually harassed, the responsible male may be killed.112 When people 
discover a case of rape, the sentence imposed is harsh. “In one example, 
in a case of rape amongst Hazaras, the Jirga ordered the woman to 
receive 60 lashes and the male perpetrator be stoned to death.”113
Thereafter, her husband divorced her; she became depressed and finally 
died.114
These decisions conflict with Islamic principles which mandate that 
marriage is based on the complete consent of a boy and a girl — whether 
she is a virgin, divorced or widowed.115 Similarly, these decisions are 
against state laws of Afghanistan.116 For instance, Article 517 of the 
penal code states, “[a] person who gives in marriage a widow, or a girl 
who is [eighteen] years or older, contrary to her will or consent, [he or 
she] shall be sentenced in view of the circumstances to short[-term] 
imprisonment.”117 In addition, Article 70 of the Civil Code states that the 
minimum age for marriage should be sixteen for girls and eighteen for 
boys.118 Moreover, Article 23(2)(3) International Convention on Civil 
and Political Rights, of which Afghanistan is a party, emphasizes free 
and full consent of men and women in marriage.119
c. Government Efforts in the Past Decade 
For the past ten years, the Afghan government and international 
community have worked to address some of these issues within the 
informal justice system, but there has been little cognizable progress or 
 111. Id.
 112. BARFIELD, supra note 31, at 17. 
 113. Luke et al., supra note 61. 
 114. Id.
 115. BARFIELD ET AL., supra note 2, at 7–8. 
 116. Id.
 117. Penal Code of Afghanistan, 347 OFFICIAL GAZETTE 13, art. 517 (1976). 
 118. Civil Code of the Republic of Afghanistan (Civil Code), 353 OFFICIAL
GAZETTE, art. 70 (1976). 
 119. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 23 §§ 2-3, Dec. 19, 
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.  
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change.120 Instead, the majority of success has been with legal and justice 
reforms — primarily in the form of legislative reforms.121 With 
corruption and deteriorated security as the biggest challenges, rural areas 
almost inevitably refer to traditional institutions to resolve their disputes; 
nonetheless, the above example of dispute resolution in the Nangarhar 
province highlight the role and monitoring of the informal justice system 
by Afghan state actors.122 Arsala Jamal, the governor of the Khost 
province requested The Liaison Office to create the Commission on 
Conflict Mediation (CCM or “the Commission”).123 The Commission 
was created in 2006, consisting of six respected tribal elders; it provides 
an informal dispute resolution to local people out-of-court.124 In the first 
eighteen months, the Commission received thirty-one cases of which 
eighteen were solved, ten were in process, and three were submitted to 
formal courts.125 The main reasons for the Commission’s success are its 
ability to offer arbitration services free of charge and its ability to solve 
disputes impartially.126
Afghanistan has progressed in moving towards the effective rule of 
law both in formal and informal legal systems, including the construction 
and rebuilding of justice infrastructures, capacity building trainings, 
drafting and passing of new laws, improving traditional justice 
mechanisms, and working closely with Community Based Dispute 
Resolution Mechanisms, which are at the center of these successes.127
However, the predominance of warlords in some rural areas, wide-spread 
corruption in official offices, and lack of security in most areas of 
Afghanistan have slowed reforms.128
 120. William Maley, Building Legitimacy in Post-Taliban Afghanistan, in STATE
BUILDING, SECURITY, AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN AFGHANISTAN, supra note 56, at 11. 
 121. See generally INT’L CRISIS GRP., REFORMING AFGHANISTAN’S BROKEN
JUDICIARY (2010). 
 122. Smith, supra note 7, at 76–80. 
 123. See generally THE LIAISON OFF., U.S. INST. OF PEACE, BETWEEN THE JIRGA
AND THE JUDGE (2009), http://www.usip.org/files/file/jirga_judge.pdf. 
 124. Id.
 125. Id.
 126. Id.
 127. SMITH & MANALAN, supra note 72, at 41. 
 128. See generally NOAH COBURN, U.S. INST. OF PEACE, INFORMAL JUSTICE AND 
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN AFGHANISTAN (2013),
https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PW84-
94 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 25.1 
IV. FORMAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN AFGHANISTAN
Afghanistan is an Islamic country and according to the Constitution of 
Afghanistan, no law can be passed in contradiction with Islamic 
principles.129 The Quran is the most powerful source of criminal law, 
containing up to thirty verses regarding criminal law—most of which 
refer to substantive criminal law rather than criminal procedure.130
According Islamic law, Tazir Crimes are lifted to the discretion of rulers 
who are bound to the principles of Islam.131 Accordingly, the Islamic 
government has the authority to create, adapt, and transplant criminal 
laws unless they contradict Islamic principles.132
On the other hand, Sharia has historically played a significant role in 
Afghanistan’s legal system.133 Trained religious judges follow the Hanafi 
legal tradition implemented by Islamic religious law (shari’a).134 “They 
were part of a larger class of professional clerics (ulema) who issued 
opinions (fetwa) on religious issues.”135 There is comprehensive 
scholarship examining the role of Shari’a in Afghanistan legal society 
and studies have shown that Afghanistan’s legal system is rooted deeply 
in Islamic principles.136 For instance, the first article of the 1976 Afghan 
penal code states that Hodod, Qassas and Diat crimes are punished in 
accordance with the Islamic provisions of Hanafi jurisprudence.137
Accordingly, the criminal code in Afghanistan is based on Islamic 
principles and the legislature fills the gaps.138
Informal%20Justice%20and%20the%20International%20Community%20in%20Afghani
stan.pdf.
 129. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN art. 3. 
 130. Silvia Tellenbach, Fair Trial Guarantees in Criminal Proceedings Under 
Islamic, Afghan Constitutional and International Law, 64 ZAÖRV 929, 929 (2004).  
 131. Id. at 930. 
 132. Id.
 133. See BARFIELD, supra note 31, at 2.  
 134. Tellenbach, supra note 130, at 932.
 135. Barfield, supra note 39, at 352; Wardak, supra note 57, at 324. 
 136. Tellenbach, supra note 130, at 932. 
 137. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, Penal Code, 347 OFFICIAL GAZETTE, art. 1 (1976). 
 138. ORZALA ASHRAF NEMAT, COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF FAMILY LAW IN THE 
CONTEXT OF ISLAM 5 (Jawed Nader trans., 2006); MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN 1 (2007), http://mfa.gov.af/Content/files/ 
Romejointrecommandations.pdf.  
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a. Afghan Criminal Courts 
According to the Constitution of Afghanistan, the judiciary is an 
independent entity of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.139 It consists 
of the Supreme Court, appeal courts, and preliminary or trial courts that 
all consist of criminal courts.140 The Supreme Court manages its 
activities through its various departments or dewans.141 In addition, the 
Supreme Court is responsible for the administration of a court system 
consisting of 34 provincial courts and 384 primary courts throughout 
Afghanistan.142 The Supreme Court of Afghanistan has five divans—one
of which is a criminal diwan.143 The second court with the highest 
authority is the Appellate court.144 All provinces have the Court of 
Appeals for various departments or diwans—one of which is a criminal 
diwan that settles criminal cases at the provincial level.145 The lowest 
court in the hierarchical structure of the Afghan court system is 
comprised of the primary courts.146 The primary courts are located within 
districts and cities.147 The numbers of departments vary from district and 
city.148 Generally, each district has a primary court that settles civil and 
criminal cases at the district level.149
b. Jurisdiction of Criminal Courts
The judiciary branch has exclusive authority to resolve disputes 
between individuals or institutions and individuals.150 According to 
Article 2 of Law on Organization and Jurisdiction of Courts, the 
 139. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN art. 116. 
 140. Id.; see also MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, Law on Organization and Jurisdiction of 
Judiciary Branch of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 1109 OFFICIAL GAZETTE (2012). 
 141. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 140, art. 42. 
 142. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN arts. 117–18, 
121, 138; AFGHANISTAN RESEARCH AND EVALUATION UNIT, supra note 27, at 77. 
 143. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 140, art. 42. 
 144. Id. art. 52. 
 145. AFGHANISTAN RESEARCH AND EVALUATION UNIT, supra note 27, at 76. 
 146. See id.
 147. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 140, art. 61; see also AFGHANISTAN 
RESEARCH AND EVALUATION UNIT, supra note 27, at 76. 
 148. AFGHANISTAN RESEARCH AND EVALUATION UNIT, supra note 27, at 77. 
 149. See id. at 76. 
 150. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 140. 
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judiciary is an independent body of the state: “The Judiciary shall be the 
independent pillar of the state and composed of the Supreme Court, 
Courts of Appeal and Primary Courts. Traveling courts may be 
established when needed, on recommendation by the Supreme Court and 
approval of the President.” 151 In addition, Article 4 of this law gives the 
courts exclusive jurisdiction to settle all cases within its personal and 
subject matter jurisdiction, “[n]o law under any circumstances may take 
a case out of the jurisdiction of judiciary and submit it to a different 
authority.”152 However, there is a huge gap between what is in the law 
and what is in action.153 In other words, in some areas, especially rural 
areas, the courts do not have jurisdiction and that is because of a lack of 
efficiency of formal courts in these areas.154
V. INFORMAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
Because state justice organizations do not have much presence in 
many parts of the country, especially in rural areas, and are incapable of 
solving many disputes in justifiable ways that meet the needs of 
Afghanis, in many parts of the country, people prefer to bring their cases 
to informal dispute resolution mechanisms, or community-based dispute 
resolution, which they find to be more transparent, clear, and 
predictable.155 As explained in previous sections, these practices can 
involve such harsh remedies as forcing marriage between a girl from a 
murderer’s family with a member of the murder-victim’s family.156
Despite these deeply rooted traditions, Afghanistan’s informal legal 
system is in flux157 because some educated people in rural areas do not 
want to follow informal dispute resolution that has negative effects on 
societies such as giving girls as compensation (Badal), child marriage, 
and so on.158
 151. Id. art. 2. 
 152. Id. art. 4. 
 153. TOLO NEWS, supra note 3. 
 154. Id. 
 155. DEMPSEY & COBURN, supra note 4, at 1. 
 156. UNAMA, supra note 92, at 11.  
 157. See generally BARFIELD, supra note 31. 
 158. Interviews with students, in rural areas of Afghanistan (Spring 2013). 
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a. Traditional Mechanisms of Dispute Resolution 
Afghans have used traditional mechanisms of dispute resolution for 
centuries.159 Informal mechanisms are known as jirgas, shuras,
community development councils, and other Afghan customary justice 
mechanisms.160 The traditional mechanisms of dispute resolution pre-date 
the formal justice mechanisms and they have been used as a means of 
dispute resolution and communal reconciliation for issues of both a civil 
and criminal nature.161
The purpose of shura and jirga, or any other traditional mechanism of 
dispute resolution is to restore harmony in a community.162 Unlike formal 
courts, traditional dispute resolution bodies have a different objective.163
The formal courts focus on establishing guilt and punishing the guilty, 
while the traditional courts focus on the needs of the victim and society’s 
harmony.164 To achieve this, Coburn Noah, a researcher and writer at the 
Unites States Institutes of peace points out that “[i]nformal dispute 
resolution often relies on bodies of elders whose collective reputations 
give the resolution legitimacy and create collective social pressure on the 
community to respect the decision.”165 The community elders and other 
respected individuals sit together in the shuras, jirgas, or other 
Community Development Councils to reach equitable resolutions and to 
reconcile the “disputants, their families and the community as a 
whole.”166 Traditional justice mechanisms are perceived by the local 
population to be less costly and more accessible than the state courts.167
Also, traditional justice resolution mechanisms are more likely to be 
enforced than those of state institutions because disregarding decisions of 
 159. See BARFIELD ET AL., supra note 2, at 2. 
160. Id. at 7. 
 161. Smith, supra note 7, at 75. 
 162. BARFIELD ET AL., supra note 2, at 7. 
 163. Id.: see also Idirs Iffat, Alternative Dispute Resolution: The Informal Justice 
Sector in Pakistan, in OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES 3 (Lead Pakistan, 2007). 
 164. Iffat, supra note 163. 
 165. NOAH COBURN, UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE REPORT 2011: THE 
POLITICS OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND CONTINUED INSTABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN 4 
(2011).
 166. BARFIELD ET AL., supra note 2, at 6–7; DEMPSEY & COBURN, supra note 4, at 
2.
 167. DEMPSEY & COBURN, supra note 4, at 2. 
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respected local leaders can be disruptive to social harmony. 168 However, 
despite this effectiveness, judgments issued by local bodies have various 
problems: they are sometimes not recorded, they may favor the powerful, 
and they may occasionally discriminate against vulnerable groups, 
including women and children.169
b. Benefits and Drawbacks of Traditional Mechanisms of Dispute 
Resolution
Traditional mechanisms of dispute resolution have been praised for 
promptness, clarity, effectiveness, and being familiar to the population; 
they are also less costly and more accessible than formal courts.170 In 
addition, the decisions of shuras and jirgas tend to be acceptable for both 
sides of a conflict, reaching final resolutions in much less time than 
formal courts171 Unlike in court proceedings, the main purpose of 
informal resolution is to eliminate a dispute in a peaceful manner rather 
than focus on a winner and loser or on penalizing wrongdoers.172
Almost all of the literature on post-war justice systems in Afghanistan 
focus on the benefits of traditional mechanisms of dispute resolution, 
pointing to the effectiveness, cultural familiarity, lack of corruption, 
prompt resolutions, cheaper costs, accessibility, unanimity, enforceable 
decisions, trust and fairness, and focus on restorative justice and 
preserving harmony within the community.173 At the same time, 
traditional mechanisms of dispute resolutions are associated with sharp 
violations of state law and sometimes even Islamic principles, which 
reduces the appeal of traditional dispute resolution in the eyes of some 
people in Afghanistan and the international community.174
 168. COBURN, supra note 165, at 4; DEMPSEY & COBURN, supra note 4, at 2; 
SHAHID M. SHAHIDULLAH, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS: GLOBAL AND 
LOCAL PERSPECTIVES 35 (Jones & Bartlett Learning ed., 1st ed., 2012). 
 169. See generally UNAMA, supra note 92. 
 170. See ANNE-CATHERINE CLAUDE, CIVIL-MILITARY FUSION CENTRE,
AFGHANISTAN – JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION: THE INFORMAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN 
AFGHANISTAN 4 (2010). 
 171. DEMPSEY & COBURN, supra note 4, at 2. 
 172. Id.
 173. Id. at 3. 
 174. See generally UNAMA, supra note 92. 
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Chief among these failings concerns the subjugation of women in the 
process itself. Traditional dispute mechanisms put men in a position of 
power and exclude women from the judgment processes; regardless of 
the nature of the dispute, whether it concerns rape, domestic violence, 
marriage, children, or property, men represent women and women are 
not allowed to participate in the proceedings or voice their own 
concerns.175
Second, the most criticized aspect of using traditional mechanisms of 
dispute resolution is baad—the marriage of a woman from the offender’s 
family to the victim’s close relative to settle a dispute.176 This aspect of 
the traditional dispute resolution has caught a lot of attention by the 
international community and human rights activists.177 Notably, the 
Afghan government has been under extreme pressure to resolve this issue 
by trying to establish a relationship with informal justice mechanisms in 
rural areas, but these efforts have mostly failed because law enforcement 
institutions are weak or do not exist at all in those areas.178
Third, community-based mechanisms can be very susceptible to 
dominance by warlords.179 Local power-holders, who are mostly elected 
as members of informal justice mechanisms through their influence and 
force, are more likely to misuse the informal system because they are 
driven to protect their own illegal activities and benefits—warlords use 
their gunmen and political influence to impose their decisions on both 
formal institutions and local people.180 In some instances, informal 
dispute resolution has become a shopping arena for rich people; in fact, 
they pay the warlords to judge in their favor when they have a dispute.181
Importantly, the poor have to accept any verdict either in their favor or 
not.182 Thus, involving warlords in settling criminal and civil disputes in 
175. Luke et al., supra note 61, at 2. 
 176. UNAMA, supra note 92. 
 177. See generally UNAMA, supra note 92. 
 178. See generally BARFIELD, supra note 31. 
 179. See BARFIELD ET AL., supra note 2, at 14–15. 
 180. Heading for Trouble in Afghanistan, MICHELSEN INST. (Sept. 26, 2012), 
http://www.cmi.no/news/?1065-heading-for-trouble-in-afghanistan; see also Christina
Pauly-Jones & Neamat Nojumi, Balancing Relations Between Society and State: Legal 
Steps Toward National Reconciliation and Reconstruction of Afghanistan, 52 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 825, 825 (2004). 
 181. See generally BARFIELD, supra note 31. 
 182. Id.
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the rural areas, where government institutions are weak and people are 
under influence of warlords, is a problem that has no easy solution.183
This issue impairs the reliability of informal dispute resolution.184
Finally, as few incidents have been illustrated in previous sections, other 
drawbacks include honor-killings, forced and underage marriage, and 
payment of blood money in lieu of punishment.185
In conclusion, with the majority of the Afghan population living in 
rural areas, the traditional mechanisms of dispute resolution will always 
be the first choice to resolve disputes, and with insufficient or no control 
by the government to monitor their process of judgment, the human 
rights violations threatens to remain a strong drawback and challenge to 
the justice system in Afghanistan.186 Therefore, the focus of next chapter 
will be on how to establish a relationship between the formal and 
informal justice systems to fight and eliminate these challenges.  
VI. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE NATIVE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM
Similar to Afghanistan, U.S. Native American tribes have grappled 
with balancing their formal justice systems with a long history of 
informal, traditional ways of resolving conflict.187 Traditionally, Native 
American tribes had various expressive and creative ways of conducting 
dispute resolution.188 These dispute resolution methods were not familiar 
to the European settlers.189 Thus, settlers discounted and even 
discouraged Native American methods of dispute resolution.190 In 1883, 
the Department of Interior established “Courts of Indian Offenses” or 
“Courts of Federal Regulations” (“CFR Courts”) to settle less serious 
 183. See BARFIELD ET AL., supra note 2, at 14–15. 
 184. See id. at 16–17. 
 185. ALI WARDAK, DAUB SABA & HALIMA KAZEM, AFGHANISTAN HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2007: BRIDGING MODERNITY AND TRADITION: RULE OF LAW AND 
THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE 93 (2007), http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/nhdr2007.pdf; 
see also BARFIELD ET AL., supra note 2, at 3.
 186. COBURN & DEMPSEY, supra note 1, at 1.  
 187. Tribal Courts, TRIBAL COURT CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.tribal-
institute.org/lists/justice.htm (last visited May 24, 2013).  
 188. See id.
 189. Id.
 190. Id.
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criminal cases among the tribal members.191 Many judges of these courts 
were non-Native American.192 In 1934, the Indian Reorganization Act 
(25 U.S.C.A. § 461, et. seq.) was adopted not only to allow Native 
American tribes to exercise their inherent sovereignty, but to establish 
their own justice codes, run their own court systems applying those laws, 
and create and adopt their own constitutions.193 Furthermore, the Act 
provided a framework for the tribes to gradually build and expand their 
tribal governments.194
Some tribes have been successful in developing judicial systems 
while others are trying to construct and develop their government within 
the U.S. adversarial system framework.195 Some tribes use and prefer the 
U.S. adversarial system, while others still apply traditional dispute 
resolution.196 Native American governments adopting new laws and their 
courts apply these laws along with custom and tradition to settle 
disputes.197 Thus, some Native American tribes use positive law, 
regulations, and traditions to settle civil and criminal disputes of their 
members.198
VII. FORMAL NATIVE AMERICAN JUSTICE SYSTEM
The Native American criminal justice systems are composed of both 
formal and informal methods of dispute resolution.199 In the Navajo 
reservation; there is a significant integration between formal courts and 
informal peacemaking courts through active monitoring and 
partnership.200 In addition, the Native American criminal justice system 
 191. Id.
 192. Id.
 193. Id.
 194. Id.
 195. See RAYMOND D AUSTIN, NAVAJO COURTS AND NAVAJO COMMON LAW: A
TRADITION OF TRIBAL SELF-GOVERNANCE 32 (2009). 
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 197. Id.
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199. See generally Jeffrey Ian Ross & Larry Gould, Native American Criminal 
Justice, Criminological Theory, and Policy Development, in NATIVE AMERICANS AND THE 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (Jeffrey Ian Ross & Larry Gould, eds., 2006). 
 200. Interview with Elaine Henderson, Peacemaker, in Navajo Nation, in Arizona 
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has a complex relationship with the U.S. state and federal systems that 
can result in conflicts and misinterpretation.201 The study of criminal 
justice systems in Native American reservations is complex and 
overloaded with “cultural, economic, emotional, political, and social 
undertones.” 202
a. Native American Courts
The Native American formal tribal courts primarily rely on an 
adversarial system of dispute resolution similar to the U.S. state and 
federal courts.203 However, many contemporary tribal communities have 
adopted a dual justice system incorporating both the American model of 
justice and indigenous models of justice.204 The U.S. adversarial system 
includes pleadings, counterclaims, cross examination, discovery, and a 
final judgement;205 in contrast, under indigenous models of justice, 
community members and traditional methods of justice apply a more 
holistic philosophy guided by customary law, traditions, and practices 
that are learned primarily by example and through the oral teachings of 
tribal elders.206 Thus, the informal or traditional dispute mechanism in 
Native American tribes is based on a non-adversarial system.207
b. Jurisdiction of Native American Tribal Courts over Criminal 
Offenses
The jurisdiction of Native American courts over criminal offenses is 
restricted to the classification of the offense and the place of the 
 201. See generally JUSTIN B. RICHLAND, INTRODUCTION TO TRIBAL LEGAL STUDIES
(2d ed. 2010). 
 202. Ross & Gould, supra note 199, at 3, 4.  
 203. See generally PEACEMAKING PROGRAM OF THE JUDICIAL BRANCH OF THE 
NAVAJO NATION, PLAN OF OPERATIONS (2013) [hereinafter PEACEMAKING], 
http://www.navajocourts.org/Peacemaking/Plan/PPPO2013-2-25.pdf. 
 204. See generally RICHLAND, supra note 201. 
 205. JUDICIAL BRANCH OF THE NAVAJO NATION, supra note 16, at 4. 
 206. See William C. Bradford, Reclaiming Indigenous Legal Autonomy on the 
Path to Peaceful Coexistence: The Theory, Practice, and Limitations of Tribal 
Peacemaking in Indian Dispute Resolution, 76 N.D. L. REV. 551, 578–80 (2000). 
207. See MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER, AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL LAW 126 (2011). 
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incident.208 Offenders of serious crimes are tried in federal courts 
whereas crimes committed outside the reservation are within the state 
court’s jurisdiction.209 Subject matter jurisdiction in criminal cases is 
related to the three following issues: 1) whether the victim and defendant 
are Indian, 2) whether the criminal act is committed in Indian country or 
on a reservation, 3) the nature of the crime or offense (whether it is 
felony or misdemeanor).210 According to the Major Crimes Act (18 
U.S.C. § 1153 (1988)), the federal government exercises its jurisdiction 
over Native American members if they commit one or more of the 
thirteen violent felonies that are listed as follows:211 “Murder, 
manslaughter, kidnapping, maiming, a felony under chapter 109 A, 
incest, assault with intent to commit murder, assault with a dangerous 
weapon, assault resulting in serious bodily injury, arson, burglary, 
robbery and felony under section 661 of this title within Indian 
Country.”212 The Assimilative Crimes Act (18 U.S.C. § 1162) and the 
Organized Crime Control Act are also applicable to members of Indian 
Country.213 Thus, tribal law enforcement institutions cannot settle the 
aforementioned criminal cases and the involvement of federal law 
enforcement agencies is necessary.214
However, approximately 170 reservations have their own law 
enforcement department, but they do not have exclusive jurisdiction on 
all criminal matters.215 First, they should distinguish the type of offense 
(felony or misdemeanor), offender (enroll member or state citizen), and 
place of crime (Indian country, state, or federal territory).216 Then, if the 
 208. See Eileen Luna-Firebaugh and Samuel Walker, Law Enforcement and the 
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 209. Marianne O. Nielsen, Navajo Nation Courts, Peacemaking and Restorative 
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case meets the aforementioned three criteria, they can exercise their 
jurisdiction. 217
VIII. NATIVE AMERICAN INFORMAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
Many Native American tribes tend to have alternative dispute 
resolution mechanisms rooted in custom and traditional practices.218 One 
of the most effective and developed of these practices is “peacemaking” 
and “traditional dispute resolution.”219 Traditional dispute resolution is an 
ancient form of dispute resolution in which people bring their cases to 
the elders who use custom and tradition to solve cases, while 
peacemaking is a mechanism that was created just a few decades ago 
through the help of formal courts and institutions in which a peacemaker 
brings parties together to discuss the conflict or dispute to reach a 
consensual agreement.220 Nowadays, both peacemaking and traditional 
dispute resolution are used to solve civil and criminal cases through 
informal mechanisms in Native American reservations.221
a. Traditional Dispute Resolution
Another type of dispute resolution is traditional dispute resolution in 
which tribal members use customary and traditional procedural norms 
that call for non-adversarial forms of conflict management.222 Although 
Indian tribes were given the authority to run their own court systems a 
century ago, some of them preferred to maintain traditional values of 
dispute resolution to a greater extent over formal courts.223 Thus, tribal 
courts have been using traditional law in different areas of law.224 The 
method of using traditional law varies from tribe to tribe; however, they 
 217. Id.
 218. CARRIE E. GARROW & SARAH DEER, TRIBAL CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
9 (1st ed., 2004). 
 219. See id. at 57–59. 
 220. See JUDICIAL BRANCH OF THE NAVAJO NATION, supra note 16, at 1–2. 
 221. Interview with Elaine Henderson, supra note 200.  
 222. See Marilyn Holly, Navajo Criminal Justice: A Jungian Perspective, in
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all share a similar purpose reflective of native customs and traditions.225
The Navajo Nation has a “horizontal” traditional model of justice that is 
to show equality among people and, according to which, no person is 
above another.226 In this system, victims, defendants, and others who are 
effected by the committed crime, get together to discuss the situation, 
find the causes of crime, express their emotions, and agree on 
compensation that would restore the lost harmony to all concerned. 227 In 
addition, the horizontal model of dispute resolution shares the same 
principles related to the healing of parties. 228 The traditional indigenous 
and restorative justice movement trends deal with very concrete 
processes to settle disputes, especially adult criminal and juvenile 
wrongdoing cases.229
Some tribes use traditional dispute resolution in both civil and 
criminal cases, while others prefer to apply traditional mechanisms of 
dispute resolution only in civil cases.230 For example, the Hopi, a Native 
American tribe located in Arizona, have traditional dispute resolution 
justice in civil cases; however, unlike some other tribes, the Hopi court 
also has jurisdiction on some more serious crimes.231
The Hopi tribe has about 15,000 enrolled members, most of whom 
live in villages.232 Each village elects its governor, who has exclusive 
authority to decide civil cases such as land disputes, divorces, child 
custody issues, and so on.233 Parties can elect to handle their cases in 
formal Hopi courts; however, the governor must waive his right to hear 
the case.234 In most cases, the governor agrees to refer the case to the 
 225. Id. at 58–59. 
 226. Holly, supra note 222, at 17. 
 227. Id. at 17–18. 
 228. Id. at 18.  
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formal court if the parties both consent, but he rarely refers land dispute 
cases to the formal courts.235
These examples of harmony and balance between formal and informal 
justice practices in Native American tribes could be instructive to 
countries like Afghanistan in which tribal groups have long traditions of 
informal dispute resolution.236 Indeed, Afghanistan’s tribal approaches to 
informal justice dispute resolution share many values and attributes with 
these native American systems, including cost-effectiveness, time 
efficiency, and reasonable resource allocation; however, unlike Native 
American peacemaking systems, the Afghan informal system has been 
known to violate state law and human rights.237 Nevertheless, as this 
paper explores below, looking to the Native American examples may not 
only help Afghanistan find a better balance between the informal and 
formal systems, but it may also provide a way to eliminate these human 
rights abuses in the informal system. 
b. Peacemaking & Peacemakers
Navajo Peacemaking is a form of restorative justice that handles 
disputes to recover relations between individuals in conflict.238 It is one 
of the most contemporary restorative justice programs in the world.239
The [potential] of restorative justice [models] to deal effectively with 
the consequences of ‘crime’ [effectively] seems to be much greater 
because, if we want people who perpetuate violence to live peaceable 
in society, then it is sensible to develop justice models in which the 
community is involved in holding him or her accountable.240
 235. Id.
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The peacemaking program is a “horizontal system of justice”; this 
means that parties are treated equally with the aim of preserving ongoing 
relationships and returning harmony to the parties to the conflict.241
The system is considered to be a significant alternative to tribal courts 
on reservations.242 Although the first Peacemaker Courts were 
established in 1982, they were quickly institutionalized into a 
Peacemaking Court system in 1991.243 The Navajo Nation judges created 
some rules for Peacemaker Courts to resolve disputes through informal 
mechanisms without the formal adversarial procedures used by the 
Navajo Tribal Court.244 In the 2000s, the Peacemaking Court’s name was 
changed into “Peacemaking” and Chief Justice Claudeen Bates-Arthur 
substituted the peacemaking rules into guidelines.245 Later the Council 
approved the Fundamental Law of Dine, and established a peacemaking 
division, later the “Peacemaking Program”, to educate people and 
develop hozhoji naat aah (may I walk in peace) throughout the Navajo 
reservation.246 Hence, the Navajo peacemaking program not only solves 
civil and criminal cases, but also educates members of tribes to solve the 
disputes themselves and to prevent possible future conflicts.247
Similar to other restorative justice programs, the Navajo peacemaking 
courts are held outside of the formal justice halls.248 The peacemaking 
process, rather than relying on the services of formal judges, lawyers, 
and legal supporters, rely on peacemakers who are known for their 
fairness, wisdom, respect, and planning ability by community people as 
decision-making authorities.249 Like other Native Nation restorative 
programs, peacemaking is an accessible, affordable, and informal way of 
resolving conflict and achieving justice for Native American 
communities and families.250
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 242. See id. at 110. 
243. Id. at 108. 
 244. ERIC K. GROSS, EVALUATION/ASSESSMENT OF NAVAJO PEACEMAKING 5 
(1999).
 245. PEACEMAKING, supra note 203, at 2. 
 246. Id.
 247. See id. at 9. 
 248. GROSS, supra note 244, at 5. 
 249. PEACEMAKING, supra note 203, at 48. 
 250. GROSS, supra note 244, at 5. 
108 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 25.1 
Navajo Peacemaking endeavors to repair the relationship of both sides 
of the dispute instead of focusing on retaliation.251 Thus, it does not label 
the defendant as the “offender” and the other side as the “victim.”252
Each side of the dispute could possess qualities of victimization.253
“Moreover, the actualization of violence perpetrated by one person on 
another will ultimately be understood as the absence of love and 
nurturance for that person.”254 Peacemaking sessions are held to repair 
damaged feelings of both sides of the dispute; therefore, the process 
continues until feelings of parties are satisfied.255 Peacemaker, Elaine 
Henderson, says that Peacemakers solve conflicts between parties by 
giving them advice, healing their hearts, and making them aware of 
possible results of cases.256 A Peacemaker concentrates on the 
relationships between people.257 She believes “clanship” relates person to 
person and strengthens relationships.258 According to clanship, someone 
is your brother, uncle, or father; so, a father and uncle have the 
responsibility to look after you and prohibit you from bad behavior.259
Everyone has to respect others and take part in problem solving.260
Ultimately, Ms. Henderson also explains that her role is to remove the 
misunderstanding and miscommunication among people in the 
community.261 She teaches culture, tradition, clanship, and discipline to 
make parties aware of their culture, tradition, and past relation that make 
them aware of whatever they may have forgotten from their past.262
Although cases between neighbors and relatives constitute a large 
number of peacemaking cases, quite a few cases are also criminal such 
as: burning down of people’s homes, threats to murder, and occasional 
assault and battery cases.263
 251. Id. at 7. 
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i. Peacemaking in Criminal Cases 
With the evolution of tribal government, criminal law and procedure 
has changed.264 Even though the U.S. federal government gave authority 
to the Navajo and other Indian tribes to run their own courts 
approximately a century ago, the Navajo Nation maintains traditional 
values of dispute resolution to a greater extent than other tribal courts in 
many other American Indian communities.265 Many Native American 
courts have different programs in their prosecutor’s office that include 
community justice and formal dispute resolution.266 Peacemaking is one 
good way to recommend appropriate disciplinary actions to the criminal 
or defendant and to address victims’ rights. 267 Parties to the conflict; 
victims and its relatives; and defendant and its relatives, settle and agree 
on the terms of sentence and ask a Peacemaker to deliver it for them.268
In addition, Peacemakers can influence decisions not by imposing 
them or taking sides; instead they present ideas and suggestions on how 
parties can discuss and resolve their disputes.269 Thus, Peacemaking is a 
pivotal settlement of dispute approach for Native American communities 
since it includes their involvement in the dispute resolution process and 
responds to their needs.270 In addition, it is a good rehabilitative process 
for the offenders because in Navajo restorative justice the burden is on 
all components of the justice system to work for the offender’s 
rehabilitation and bring him or her back to the community in a peaceful 
way.271 In addition, this system does not label individuals as the offender, 
or wrongdoer, and the victim.272 Instead, it encourage parties to 
“Hozhoogo naashaadoo (may I walk-in peace) and Hozhoojii saad bee 
atchI yadeilti doo (may we communicate in peace).”273 The Peacemaking 
 264. GARROW & DEER, supra note 218, at 53. 
 265. Holly, supra note 222, at 17. 
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Program teaches the offender and victim their responsibilities, how to be 
a good person, and how to prevent criminal offenses.274
ii. Peacemaking in Civil Cases
Navajo Nation Peacemakers solve a large number of civil cases 
through healing, talking, looking for alternatives, and guidance to the 
involved parties.275 For instance, in a divorce case, peacemakers “may 
engage in talking with the person or persons in order to see if alternatives 
to a divorce are possible, and the family preserved.”276 For this purpose, 
the peacemaker makes the parties (husband and wife) aware of upcoming 
results of the divorce that could cause social and mental problems of 
their children.277 The Peacemaker says to the parties, do not think about 
yourself, think about your children and their future.278 What will happen 
if you divorce? Parties to conflict mostly accept the Peacemaker’s 
advice.279
IX. ANALYSIS: LESSONS FOR AFGHANISTAN FROM THE NAVAJO NATION 
It is both necessary and critical that the Afghan criminal justice 
system strengthens its ability to resolve criminal disputes all over the 
country.280 In urban areas, the formal criminal justice system governs all 
criminal disputes and these Afghans can access the formal justice 
system.281 However, the formal criminal justice institutions, including 
criminal courts, do not function in some rural areas and lack the capacity 
to effectively administer justice.282 As shown in earlier sections of this 
paper, this lack of capacity and effectiveness of formal legal institutions 
in rural areas has several causes such as: 1) since 2001, the Afghan 
government and international forces have failed to maintain and stabilize 
security in the most rural areas; 2) the strong influence and dominance of 
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warlords exacerbate the problem in rural areas because they misuse their 
power and influence; 3) the presence of widespread corruption especially 
in the district courts.283 Therefore, it is better to focus on strengthening 
and reforming existing traditional institutions and linking them to state 
institutions rather than trying to marginalize them.  
In the short term, cooperation between the informal dispute settlement 
mechanisms and the formal legal institutions will produce a much better 
system that can resolve community disputes. For instance, the 
involvement of the formal system would reduce the freedom of jirgas
and shuras in dispute settlement by subjecting them to a series of rules 
and regulations. Regardless, the informal system would still be 
accessible to tribal and community members possibly throughout the 
country.  
While the absence of trust in the formal institution, due to widespread 
corruption, has created a sense of dissatisfaction and the feeling that the 
legal institutions are unfair, once the two systems are linked, the local 
peoples’ trust will increase in the system because of the integration of 
their own leaders into the formal system, who they can trust. 
Accordingly, the creation of a mechanism that links the formal courts 
and institutions with the informal one is necessary and can function quite 
efficiently. This will function similar to the Peacemaking Program in the 
Navajo Nation, where the minor criminal disputes are settled by the 
informal entities and the outcome is registered and recorded in the formal 
courts records.284
In addition, the Afghan informal justice system is praised for its 
promptness, clarity, cultural familiarity, trustworthy outcomes, prompt 
resolutions, lower costs, accessibility, unanimous enforceable decisions, 
fairness, and focus on restorative justice and preserving harmony within 
the community;285 however, it has been condemned for violation of 
human rights, especially women’s rights, Islamic principles, and state 
law.286 For example, as explained above, shuras and jirgas treat women 
quite discriminatorily and harsh in cases involving marriage and divorce 
issues.287 They also do not pay due regard to Islamic and state law and 
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principles because they mostly rely on traditional custom to resolve 
major criminal cases, including cases that involve murders, rapes, house-
fleeing, and theft.288 Thus, in the long term, it is better to limit the 
authority of the informal justice system to less serious crimes and to 
restrict decisions for more serious criminal cases to the formal courts. 
a. Barriers to Implementing this New Approach
Both formal and informal justice systems in Afghanistan are 
confronted with some barriers; these barriers do not let the systems solve 
civil and criminal matters appropriately and effectively.289 Some of these 
barriers are as follows.    
i. Security  
The justice system of Afghanistan, like elsewhere, is closely related to 
security.290 Lack of security is one big barrier toward access to justice 
and stabilizing the rule of law.291 Thus, it is difficult to implement state 
laws and regulations in some rural areas of Afghanistan.292 It can also be 
a barrier to implementing some of the broad and unfocused traditional 
dispute resolutions such as jirgas and shuras because the insurgents only 
believe in their own justice system to ensure their own interests.293
Unfortunately, that justice system is neither in accordance with the state 
law of Afghanistan nor Islamic Law and the cultural values of the 
people.294 However, one possible solution could be to start the reform 
from the secure places and expand it to other areas gradually. That 
reform includes involving more local actors that deliver justice and 
maintain the rule of law through informal dispute resolution. That way, 
justice will be delivered and the rule of law will be maintained while also 
strengthening the security situations and bringing stability by promoting 
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local actors and elders who are valued and are perceived to be deserved 
decision-makers in the area.  
ii. Lack of Rule of Law  
The contemporary formal justice system of Afghanistan, including 
formal courts, is often seen to be, corrupt, expensive, inaccessible, and 
not trustworthy to the rural people.295 In addition, some judges, 
prosecutors, and police officers are not well trained and sometimes they 
themselves violate state laws.296 Hence, the formal justice institutions are 
less capable to settle serious crimes and monitor the informal justice 
system when dealing with less serious crimes. However, strengthening 
the rule of law may be achieved through maintaining security by 
empowering the Afghan police and National Army. 
It is unrealistic to believe that informal justice systems are immune 
from warlords, corruption, nepotism, and other factors influencing the 
procedural fairness. A big barrier is the interference of local 
commanders, warlords, and powerful government officials in the 
decision-making processes within the system of informal legal 
practices.297 Another barrier is the lack of legal knowledge among 
community leaders or elders.298 Most of the jirgas and shuras members 
are local elders who only have basic legal knowledge or none at all 
regarding the laws and regulations of Afghanistan.299 Thus, while making 
decisions, they possibly violate state laws and human right principles.300
b. Suggestions for a New Approach to Working with the Informal 
Justice System 
In order to improve the informal justice system in the rural areas of 
Afghanistan and avoid the corrosive aspects of informal dispute 
resolution, I propose the following recommendations: 
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i. Collaboration of Formal Courts and Law Enforcement 
Institutions with the Informal Justice System 
The Native American justice system, especially the Navajo Nation 
justice system, could be a good model for the Afghan government to 
follow, because in the Navajo Nation, there is not only collaboration of 
courts with the peacemaking program, but also with other government 
institutions in order to achieve its goals.301 Similarly, the Afghan courts 
and law enforcement institutions could help community-based resolution 
bodies to solve most criminal and civil cases in peaceful ways that could 
fulfill the needs of both parties to the conflict. 
ii. Appropriate Dispute Resolution  
Like the Native American peacemaking program, the Afghan 
informal justice system should focus on healing hearts, finding 
appropriate alternatives, and peaceful resolution of disputes. As 
mentioned above, Native American tribal peacemaking programs solve 
criminal disputes in ways that satisfy the needs of the parties to the 
conflict and do not contradict reservation law or state law.302
iii. Who Should Decide What? 
The Afghan informal justice system should settle only minor criminal 
cases. Cases involving murder, theft, rape, honor killing, and so on, 
should be handed by formal legal institutions. Like the Native American 
tribes, if these cases are brought to informal dispute bodies, they should 
be removed to the formal courts through a mutually respectful process 
fostered by a cooperative relationship and communication between the 
formal and informal systems. As a part of this cooperative relationship, 
province governors and district governors should be given authority to 
observe informal dispute resolution in less serious criminal cases, and the 
convention of jirga and shura should be called upon to settle large 
dispute between tribes. 
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iv. Educating Community Members 
The Navajo peacemaking programs educate the community members 
on how they should settle their disputes and inform them of their social 
responsibilities.303 This program has been very effective in the Navajo 
Nations, and the Afghan informal justice system could benefit from the 
same kind of programming. This programming could be led by local 
elders, law school students, and maybe even district governors who could 
educate the community members and inform them on the functions of the 
formal and informal justice systems and the ways in which they can 
resolve their disputes peacefully and effectively.  
v. Communication, Monitoring, and Removal  
The formal and informal justice systems can be integrated either 
through establishing formal institutions to take over and manage 
informal justice mechanisms. In this approach, informal justice 
mechanisms would refer cases to formally established institutions for 
settlement. The formal institutions would advise the informal institutions 
in settling that particular dispute. Then the informal institutions would 
issue the decision to the parties. This could be a mutual dispute 
settlement mechanism. However, this approach seems quite challenging 
to achieve, for two reasons. First, if formal institutions take over informal 
justice mechanisms, it is likely that formal institutions will face 
resistance from the local communities and tribes as they do not believe in 
the formal institutions’ effectiveness. The second, and perhaps the more 
important, reason is that local communities and tribes are not willing to 
let the traditional way of settling disputes, which they have known since 
they first resolved a dispute, go easily. 
A more realistic approach that can integrate the formal and informal 
justice systems in Afghanistan could be that both mechanisms should 
build a partnership in which informal institutions refers most serious 
criminal cases, such as murder, rape, and serious domestic violence to 
the formal institutions for settlement. Formal institutions in turn would 
refer less serious criminal cases, such as minor theft, less serious injuries, 
minor domestic violence, and obscenity to the informal system for 
303. See generally PEACEMAKING, supra note 203. 
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settlement. This approach has multiple advantages. First, the formal 
institutions will help enforce decisions of the informal institutions when 
the parties refuse to agree. Second, the referral of the most serious 
criminal cases to the formal system will preserve the legal rights of the 
parties to the case.  
Once the formal and informal justice systems are linked and the 
community is informed of both the formal and informal disputes 
settlement methods, the system should be monitored by state officials. 
Active monitoring by the formal law enforcement institutions and the 
creation of regular mechanisms that build links between the state and 
traditional systems could help hold the informal peacemakers within 
their limits and encourage adherence to and compliance with the formal 
system’s laws. It can further help the formal recording and storage 
process for traditional justice decisions, registering decisions with the 
state, the designation of a respected individual as a liaison between the 
state, community, shuras and jirgas.
As many members of the informal justice mechanisms, such as 
Shuras and Jirgas, do not have any kind of legal training, they face some 
challenges in settling disputes.304 Sometimes the rights of one party are 
completely ignored because the other party is a prominent figure in a 
society or tribe.305 Here, I suggest that the formal institutions should 
monitor the informal institutions in preventing them from ignoring one 
party’s rights and accordingly direct them to act impartially. This can 
take place by training the informal dispute resolvers. Furthermore, as in 
many rural districts in Afghanistan, district governors directly act as 
members of dispute settlement institutions. I suggest that they should 
monitor the process too. For example, they can act as the state 
representative besides being a member of the informal disputes 
settlement body. In this capacity, they can avoid any violence in the 
process; and they can encourage the members of the jirgas and shuras to 
take the interests of all parties into consideration. 
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X. CONCLUSION
In most parts of rural areas jirgas and shuras play an essential role in 
the resolution of civil and criminal disputes.306 In spite of having deep 
roots at the tradition and culture, they create problems for the formal 
state justice institutions, especially when they violate human rights, 
Islamic principles, and state law.307 Nonetheless, people in rural areas 
consider jirgas and shuras as legitimate and authoritative bodies of 
dispute resolution.308 Informal justice institutions could be considered as 
an important factor of stabilizing the rule of law and improving access to 
justice, if they function according Islamic principles, human right 
principles, and state laws. Hence, to make the Afghan informal justice 
system sufficient and effective, they should be reformed and monitored 
through formal institutions and law enforcement entities. To reduce the 
negative effects of informal dispute resolution, the Afghan informal 
justice system should follow the Native American informal dispute 
resolution and peacemaking model, especially the Navajo Nations, in 
less serious crimes and submit serious crime cases to the formal courts. 
Afghan informal dispute resolution systems are common in the most 
rural areas of Afghanistan, and they have been praised for their 
promptness, clarity, low cost, effectiveness, and familiarity to the local 
people.309 However, they have also caused concern because they have 
been known to violate state laws, Islamic principles, and human rights. 
The most pressing of these concerns is related to human rights.310 Thus, 
to ensure rule of law, and protect principles of human rights, and Islamic 
law within informal systems, it will be necessary to develop a 
cooperative system of communication, monitoring, and removal of 
serious cases to formal courts.  
This paper argues that if Afghanistan learns from the Navajo Nation’s 
Peacemaking system, it will promote a much better dispute resolution 
mechanism, incorporating cooperation and monitoring and implementing 
an appropriate and respectful system of removal of serious cases, which 
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will link the formal and informal justice systems to promote peace and 
justice in all regions of Afghanistan.
